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TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-· AssIGNMENT OF WHOLESALER's'
ONE WHo WILL CoNTINUE TO SELL THE IDENTICAL Goons -

MARK To

In cross suits for infringement of trade mark between the C Distilling Company and the P Brewing Company over the use of the trade mark "Century
Club" on liquor and beer respectively, a collateral question arose, whether the
assignment under which the distilling company claimed a right to the name
was valid. The assignor of the trade mark was a wholesaler of several different
brands of liquor that were produced by different distillers. The particular brand
"Century Club" was manufactured by the C Distilling Co. The wholesaler
assigned its right to use the name "Century Club" to the C Distilling Company,
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retaining, however, its entire sales organization and the right to continue selling
its other brands. Held, the assignment was good without a transfer of the
wholesale business, because the C Distilling Company was going to sell the
s~e goods that the wholesaler had been selling. Ph. Schneider Brewing Co.
v. Century Distilling Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 699.
The decision in the principal case is not surprising, for the Maryland Court
of Appeals as far back as 1875 upheld the assignment of a trade mark by a
middleman to the manufacturer of the goods to which the mark was attached.1
But the rationale of this holding is extremely interesting in view of the difficulty that attends the efforts of judges to adapt outworn trade mark concepts
to the solution of present day problems. The reasoning in the Maryland case
is fairly typical of the approach taken in the older assignment cases. The
opinion in that case begins with the assumption that the function of a trade
mark is to designate the manufacture of an article by a particular person, or at
a particular place, and then reasons therefrom that where a trade mark is
assigned to the person who manufactured the article to which the mark is
affixed, there is no false representation to the public, because the article is still
manufactured at the same place and by the same person. In the present case
the court repeats the old rule that generally a trade mark may not be assigned
"in gross," 2 and then it goes on to say that here an exception is to be made
because the assignee is going to sell the same goods. Apparently this is but
another way of stating the argument in the Maryland case. While the decision
in the principal case may be in accord with modern principles, unfortunately
the court failed to take the opportunity here presented to help clarify judicial
thinking on this subject. Thus in the Maryland case the decision was grounded
on the premise that the £unction of a trade mark is to indicate the origin
and ownership of goods, and nothing more. The court in the principal case
does not make plain that it is proceeding on a different theory. While once
the primary £unction of a trade mark may have been to indicate origin
and ownership, today it is generally recognized that a trade mark is capable of
serving a number of other legitimate functions depending on the source of the
good will which the mark identifies.8 Briefly stated, the modern view of the
assignment of a trade mark is: (I) that a trade mark is not separable from
the good will which it identifies, and that the right to use a mark will pass
with the transfer of that good will although the general business in connection
with which it has been used is retained by the seller; and (2) that the court
Witthaus v. Braun, 44 Md. 303 (1875).
See Grismore, "The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names," 30 MicH.
L. REv. 489 at 491 et seq. (1932), where it is clearly pointed out that the term
has no essential meaning and that its constant reiteration in judicial opinion can serve
no purpose but to confuse.
·
1

2

s SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE

MARKS (1925). Mr. Schechter's classic study demonstrates the modem trend away
from the "origin and ownership» theory, but it does not purport to classify the various
functions that a trade mark may legitimately serve in the present day. In a recent
article Professor Isaacs has undertaken to analyze the function of a trade mark and to
enumerate some of its more common meanings. See Isaacs, "Traffic in Trade-Symbols,"
44 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1931).
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must determine on the facts of each case the source of the good will represented
by the trade mark in order to assure that the public will not be deceived
by an assignment thereof.4 Thus it is conceivable that the good will of a trader
may be so dependent on his personal favor with the public that even a transfer
of the physical plant with the means of producing goods identical with those sold
by the assignor would, failing notice of the successorship, amount to deception
of the public.I; In the present case it was not made to appear how prominently
the personal name of the wholesaler figured in sales of "Century Club" liquor
to retail storekeepers and to the consumer. If the fact was simply that the trade
mark was of a general impersonal nature, indicating only that the goods sold
under it were of uniformly good quality, then the decision in the present case
was no doubt correct.
Oscar Freedenberg

4 Grismore, ''The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names," 30 M1cH.
L. REV. 489 (1932).
0 Such a case was Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Alaska Imp. Co., (C. C. Cal. 1894)
60 F. 103. For other decisions in point see authorities referred to in the Alaska
Packers' case.

